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Abstract
I present a simple model that formalizes Kahneman’s (1973) ideas and experimental work on
attention limitations. In addition, I extend his framework to account for the interaction
between attention and memory deficits. In particular, I propose that individuals optimally
allocate their divisible, but limited, attention to estimate parameters of an economic model,
by retrieving observations from a stock of memories, by means of a cognition technology. I
speculate that the model might help explain several stylized facts that are at odds with an
infinite capacity (fully rational) model.
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1. Introduction 
  In recent years there has been a flurry of research that departs from the rational agent 
paradigm in order to explain economic phenomena that are at odds with the standard 
model. This note tackles one particular departure from the assumption of an omniscient 
rational agent; namely, the limited use of available information due to scarce cognitive 
resources and memory deficits.  
  I take as a starting point the ideas and experimental work of Kahneman (1973) on 
attention limitations and extend his framework to account for the interaction between 
attention and memory deficits. In particular, the behavioral model is based on the 
assumption that individuals optimally allocate their divisible, but limited, attention to 
estimate parameters of an economic model, by retrieving observations from a stock of 
memories, by means of a cognition technology.      
     In the next section I present a general model of attention allocation while, in the 
framework of an inference problem, section 3 formalizes the interaction between the 
attention allocation policy and memory limitations. In section 4 I briefly consider some 
applications of the model. Section 5 compares and contrasts the model with the current 
literature and concludes. 
2. The Allocation of Mental Effort 
  This section develops a formal model of attention based on the ideas and 
experimental work of Kahneman (1973). The model is based on the following premises. 
First, attention (mental effort) is a scarce resource (input). Second, the input is divisible 
(i.e. processing is parallel as opposed to serial) among activities which might differ in 
their demands. Third, the effort exerted to a given activity determines a particular output. 
The “production” of such output is achieved with a given cognition technology. Finally, 
the allocation of the input is done in an optimal way.  Figure 1, which is an adaptation of 
Kahneman (1973 pg 10), illustrates the interaction between these elements.  
  To formalize these ideas consider the following framework. At a given instant in time 
there are m actions that demand attention. Let  i a  denote the performance (consequence) 
in the i-th action for a given level of effort and suppose that the satisfaction, ( ) i i a m , 
received from these is separable  
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 2 ...... m m U a a a m m m = + + +         (1) 
where ( ) . i m  is a strictly concave function. Further, suppose that the cognition technology-
output relationship is described by  
( ) i i i f e a =             (2) 
where  ( ) i i f e  represents a (concave) cognition technology for a given level of effort. This 
is subject to the capacity (k) constraint 
1 2 ....... m e e e k + + + =            (3) 
  Using (2) and (3) we can write the technology constraint as a cognition possibilities 
frontier   2 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1 2 2 ..... m m f a f a f a k
- - - + + + = .          (4) 
  The optimal allocation of mental effort implies the following condition, 
( ) ( )
' 1 ' 0  i i i i a f a i m l
- - = "           (5) 
wherel is the Lagrange multiplier and represents the change in the satisfaction received 
in equilibrium given a small change in the attention capacity constraint. Equation (5) 
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which is the usual condition that the marginal rate of transformation equals the marginal 
rate of substitution among all possible actions. Figure 2 illustrates the cognition problem 
for the case of two actions. The figure shows the optimal tangency condition between the 
cognition possibilities frontier and the indifference curve and the shift in the frontier (and 
the optimal allocation of attention) given an increase in capacity from k to k’.  
  A mundane example might help to grasp the idea of the model. Consider the problem 
of how to allocate attentional resources to driving down a highway and listening to the 
radio news. The quality of driving (e.g. correctly change gears) and the amount and 
quality of the information received from the news broadcast represent the performance on 
each action. Given a processing constraint, devoting more attention to one action 
necessarily has a cost in terms of inattention to the other action. For example, paying 
more attention to driving implies missing part of the news story. On the other hand, 
devoting more cognitive resources to the story might increase the chances of having an 
accident.  
  Now suppose that it starts to rain or that the highway becomes more congested. 
Because the relative cost of attention to driving has fallen, an increase in the amount of 
attention to this action is called for. But, how to select how much more attention driving 
requires? The model proposes that at the optimum we equalize the ratio of marginal 
utilities (the change in the satisfaction received from a small change in the performance 
of each action) to the marginal rate of transformation (the performance in one action that 
the individual gives up to produce a higher performance in the other action). Thus, given 
identical preferences, a beginner driver will need to reallocate a larger amount of 
attention than an experienced driver (who has higher productivity).     
3. Divided Attention, Memory, and Least Squares 
  Most economic decisions require estimating parameters that make up an economic 
model. Recognizing this, a large amount of literature treats individuals as 
econometricians who base their decisions on a given sample of observations.  In this 
section I analyze an example of the previous framework in which the actions that demand 
attention take the form of inference problems. Importantly, individuals do not use 
databases as econometricians do but rely on their memory to infer the parameter 
estimates. Beyond providing a more realistic flavor to the inference problem, the 
advantage of such treatment is twofold. First, since the sample size is possibly small due 
to scarce cognitive resources, parameter uncertainty remains significant even if the data   3 
available is large and there are no structural shifts. Second, the endogenous characteristic 
of the sample allows quantifying the magnitude and disentangling the determinants of the 
deviations from the standard (infinite capacity) model.   
  The individual has to decide the optimal allocation of attention to make inferences 
about m (uncorrelated) variables that follow the simple process 
it i it x m e = +              (7) 
with  it e  is  ( )
2 ~ 0, i N s  and 
2
i s  is known. In the appendix I analyze the case with 
correlated variables and I show that the main qualitative results that follow remain intact. 
  Suppose that the individual’s objective is to select the estimates, ˆi m , that minimize the 
mean square errors. Further, suppose that past observations of each variable compose a 
stock of memory and that the individual focuses his attention to finding the optimal 
estimates by retrieving a sample of size  i n  from memory. A higher level of effort leads to 
a larger number of observations and a better performance in the inference problem.   
    Consider the case where the cognition technology is Cobb Douglas 
i i i e n
a F = ,            (8) 
where  i F  is a productivity parameter and  1 a £ . In this case the cognition possibilities 
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  It seems reasonable that, for a given level of effort, familiarity increases the ease with 
which information is retrieved from memory. That is, individuals are relatively more 
productive retrieving familiar information. Therefore,  i F  can be interpreted as a 
familiarity parameter. According to this an individual will, for example, find more 
difficult to retrieve a list of names randomly selected from the phone book than a list of 
famous people. Similarly, practice should improve recall. A large amount of literature 
supports this hypothesis [e.g. Mandler (1980), Gillund and Shiffrin (1984)]   
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This equation says that, at the optimum, the marginal benefit of attention to variable i 
must equal its marginal cost. Alternatively, since this holds for all samples, dividing the 
marginal benefits of recalling an observation from samples i and j and the marginal costs   4 
we obtain the condition where the marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal rate 
of transformation.  
  The optimal sample size is 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
*
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    (12) 
while the optimal level of effort follows from the production technology and the estimate 
that minimizes the mean square deviations is ( )
2 * ˆ ~ , i i i i i x N n m m s = . 
Corollary. Attention to variable j, its optimal sample size, and therefore the efficiency of 
the estimate, 
1.  Increase with capacity   
2.  Increase with its variance and decrease with the variance of all other variables. 
3.  Increase with the productivity of retrieval of this variable and decrease with the 
productivity of the other variables. 
  The intuition for the first two results is straightforward. As capacity increases the 
individual is able to retrieve more information from memory to solve the inference 
problem. If capacity were infinite the individual would be able to remember all 
observations in which case the estimate would equal the actual parameter. Second, an 
increase in the variance decreases the confidence in the estimate and thus a larger sample 
is called for. However, because the individuals’ attention is constrained this increase will 
necessarily result in a lower confidence in the other samples.  
  The fact that an increase in productivity of recall of variable j increases the effort 
invested in this variable and decreases the effort for other variables might seem 
counterintuitive at first. If, as before, productivity is interpreted as a familiarity parameter 
this implies that individuals will tend to focus their attention in the retrieval of 
observations of those variables that are relatively more familiar to them. This is quite 
surprising since one would expect that, as the familiarity of one variable (action) 
increases, the individual will distribute his limited capacity in a way that reduces the 
uncertainty on both variables.  
  To understand the intuition of the result it is useful to think about the cognition-
inference problem with two variables, say A and B. An increase in the productivity of 
retrieval of observations of variable A acts as an effective increase in the resources 
allocated to this variable. As illustrated in figure 3 this causes a biased expansion of the 
cognition possibilities frontier in the direction of variable A. Thus, we encounter a type of 
Rybczynski effect, whereby at constant commodity prices (the relative variance of the 
shocks) an increase in the supply of one input leads to an absolute increase in the output 
of the good (observations retrieved) that uses this input intensively and an absolute 
decrease in the output of the other good.  
  Although a complete treatment of a general equilibrium economy with information 
sharing is outside the scope of this note a direct extension of this result is that if   5 
individuals are allowed to share/trade memories (and risk) they will tend to specialize in 
the retrieval of those memories with which they are more familiar. In fact, Becker (1985) 
derives this result in a model of labor supply where he identifies performance for a given 
level of effort with wage income. He shows that, under the assumption that women are 
more productive for non-market activities (e.g. child care), they will tend to specialize in 
those activities, reducing their wages and participation in the labor market.    
  Finally, one can also interpret these results in terms of any actions that demand 
attention such as my previous example of driving and paying attention to the radio news. 
In some situations, however, the result of a higher (lower) level of attention for more 
(less) familiar actions is counterfactual. For example, in identical environments 
experienced drivers are generally able to perform other actions better than novice drivers. 
This situation, however, is easily accommodated by the model if increases in 
performance have a limit. In such situation, after performance in one action has reached 
the limit any further increase in productivity will allow the individual to allocate more 
effort to other concurrent activities.   
4. Applications 
  In this section I briefly speculate on the applicability of the model. The applications 
are based on research that is under way (Nocetti, 2005) and I wish that many more will 
follow. 
4.1 Portfolio Choice 
  There is a large literature, mostly in a Bayesian framework, which considers portfolio 
choice under parameter uncertainty [Zellner and Chetty (1965) is the seminal paper on 
the subject]. As one would expect, estimation risk reduces the optimal equity share. The 
endogeneity of estimation risk in the present framework might provide additional 
interesting insights. For example, more familiar equities (with higher productivity of 
recall) will have lower estimation risk and therefore the holdings on those equities will be 
larger. This might help explain the well known home bias puzzle as well as the lack of 
intra-national diversification.  
4.2 Asset Pricing 
  Timmerman (1993) shows that stock returns display excess volatility if individuals 
have to estimate the growth rate of dividends. Intuitively, the dividend yield is not 
constant as in models with “rational” agents (infinite capacity in the present framework).  
  The present model predicts, in addition, that small and lesser known stocks are more 
volatile as observed in the data [e.g. Pastor and Varonesi (2003) and Brown and Ferreira 
(2004)]. Intuitively, if the representative investor is more productive recalling more 
familiar information the volatility of the estimates and therefore the volatility of the 
dividend yield will be smaller.  
  Further, although not analyzed here, any predictable bias of memory retrieval 
introduces stock returns predictability. For example, it is well established in the 
psychology literature that individuals tend to recall information that matches in valence 
the mood at the time of retrieval (known as mood-congruence effect). If one can predict 
moods stock returns will be predictable as well [in periods of optimism (pessimism) 
investors will overestimate (underestimate) the growth rate of dividends]. It is an   6 
empirical question whether stock returns are related to, for example, the index of 
consumer sentiment which is indeed highly serially correlated.  
4.3 Consumption 
  Similar to the case of asset prices, the model might provide an explanation to the 
observed failure of the random walk hypothesis of consumption and in particular to 
Carroll, Fuhrer, and Wilcox (1994) findings that “changes in sentiment not only forecast 
changes in spending, but also cause them”.  In fact, in line with the present model where 
estimation risk is endogenous, they argue “If consumer sentiment is, in part, a measure of 
uncertainty, one might hope that a model of precautionary saving would be consistent 
with our results”.    
4.4 Inflation Expectations and Labor Supply  
  The present model, in which effort is allocated to infer parameter values, might 
complement Becker’s (1985) model of labor supply. For example, effort exerted to 
market activities might compete with the demand for attention of inferences about the 
pattern of economic variables. It is well known, for example, that labor productivity is 
negatively related with the variability of inflation. The present model suggests a possible 
explanation. When inflation is more variable people allocate more attention to infer its 
future pattern and less to market activities. 
5. Conclusion 
  A number of papers have recently explored the implications of limited attention in a 
variety of settings. For example, Gabaix and Laibson (2004) present a model in which 
agents optimally allocate thinking time. In their model individuals follow simple 
heuristics and, based on an exogenous cost of thinking, decide which good deserves the 
full capacity of attention at a given point in time (i.e. processing is serial). In contrast, the 
present note stresses that attention is limited but divisible
1. The allocation of cognitive 
resources also involves a trade-off among different cognitive operations with a 
corresponding opportunity cost. However, instead of assuming that cognitive operations 
involve an exogenous cost, because more than one action can be performed concurrently, 
the cost is endogenously given by a loss in attentiveness (and therefore performance) to 
other operations.  
  The hypothesis presented here is also close to Sims’ (2003) model of Rational 
Inattention. Sims uses the tools of information theory to develop the idea that economic 
agents decide optimally the amount of noise they receive. Information theory deals with 
the question of how much information can be processed at a given instant in time while 
Sims explores what information is acquired. In addition, I consider how the information 
is processed (a cognition technology). For example, I propose that individuals are more 
productive processing familiar information and derive important implications from such 
behavior.   
  Becker (1985) provided an early treatment of how people invest a limited amount of 
effort into competing activities. Since Kahneman’s (1973) work provides a psychological 
foundation to Becker’s introspection, the model of attention allocation in the present note 
                                                 
1 Pashler and Johnston (1998) summarize experimental evidence on attention limitations.   7 
is similar to the latter. Beyond providing further applicability to Becker’s model, focusing 
in the interaction between attention and memory deficits offers a well documented 
psychological foundation.   
  Only a few papers have explored the implications of memory deficits for economic 
behavior. Closest to the present paper, Mullainathan (2002) presents a model in which 
agents make inferences about economic variables by applying Bayes’ rule to the recalled 
history as if it were the true history. Mullainathan focuses the analysis on a number of 
well known biases and assumes that individuals follow mechanical rules. Instead, this 
note stresses that memory retrieval is a byproduct of an optimization problem. The 
advantage of the present context is the characterization of how the cognition problem 
changes with the environment while a possible drawback is the over-simplification of the 
cognition procedure.    
  The behavioral model is simple and there are many possible extensions: considering 
more sophisticated inference problems, analyzing memory biases, incorporating 
information sharing, etc. I hope that other researchers will allocate at least part of their 
attention to extent the present study.    
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APPENDIX 
Optimal Allocation of Attention with Correlated Variables 
Suppose that, as before, there are m variables that demand attention and follow the process  
it i it x m e = + . 
Now, however, suppose that the shocks to variable i are correlated with the shocks to 
variable j and denote their correlation coefficient  ij r . Then, minimizing the mean square 
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Suppose that the cognition technology is the same as before. Then, while the optimal 
estimate is the sample mean of each variable, the optimal sample size, and thus the variance 
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from which it follows that the optimal sample size is 
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The comparative statics are easier to interpret in the case of two variables, say i and j, in 
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. 
An increase in the covariance, ij s , increases (decreases) the optimal sample size of variable j 
(i) IFF the variance of variable i is larger that the variance of variable j (i.e.
2 2
i j s s > ), 
provided  0 ij s > , and it will have the opposite effect (given an increase in the absolute value 
of  ij s ) if  0 ij s < . The intuition follows directly from the case with uncorrelated variables. For 
example, if  0 ij s >  and increases the individual reallocates her attention towards the now 
relatively more volatile variable and away from the other variables.    9 
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Figure 3. Increase in Productivity of Memories Retrieval of one Variable 
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